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NOTES
RIGHT OF ABODE CASES:
THE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OF
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
V.
THE SOVEREIGNTY INTERESTS OF
CHINA
"Autonomy and independence do not grow out of being told
what to do and when to do it. It is only by having [its] needs
considered, by becoming a participant in the decision-making
process, that a child develops the capacity for autonomy."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The sovereignty of Hong Kong reverted to the People's Re-
public of China ("PRC" or "China") on July 1, 1997, after more
than 150 years of British colonial rule.' Since then, Hong
1. ELAINE HEFFNER, MOTHERING: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE OF
MOTHERHOOD AFTER FREUD AND FEMINISM 103 (1978).
2. As the fateful result of the Opium War of 1839-1842, British jurisdic-
tion in Hong Kong was acquired through three treaties with China between
1842 and 1898: the Treaty of Nanking, the Convention of Peking 1860 and
the Convention of Peking 1898. YASH GHA, HONG KONG'S NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
BASIC LAw 3-6 (2d ed. 1999). These treaties provided for a ninety-nine year
lease of Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories, an adjacent peninsula
located only a few hundred yards away at the southern tip of the Chinese
mainland, with China received nothing in return for the lease. Id. The Chi-
nese government has been resentful of these treaties and considered them as
"unequal treaties" that were "coercive," "predatory" and "forced upon" China
during the banning of opium trade. Id. at 9-12.
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Kong has transformed from a British colony to a Chinese spe-
cial administrative region ("HKSAR"). 3 Inevitably, the transfer
of sovereignty has created many problems in the recently es-
tablished HKSAR, where the common law system which has
been deeply rooted under British control contrasts with the
Chinese socialist legal approach.4 Oddly, Hong Kong and
China are now one country united by distinct and separate le-
gal systems.
Part II of this Note will discuss the recent history of Hong
Kong and its relationship with China before the resumption of
Chinese control in 1997. Part III will give an overview of the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China ("Basic Law")5 and examine the
In 1839, the Chinese Imperial Commissioner, Lin Tse-Hsu, tried to
use international law as understood by the West to stop the opium trade. Id.
at 4 n.2. Lin wrote a letter to Queen Victoria of Great Britain, stating: "Sup-
pose there were people from another country who carried opium for sale to
England and seduced your people into buying and smoking it; certainly your
honourable ruler would deeply hate it and be bitterly aroused." Id. The let-
ter included relevant parts of Vattels's Le Droit des Gens, which stated that
"it was the right of every state to stop foreign nationals from importing nox-
ious products into its territory," and the state could declare those products to
be "contraband and confiscate" them. Id. However, Queen Victoria never
replied to the letter, and later regarded those three treaties as giving the
British full sovereignty over Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories.
GHAI, supra note 2, at 4, 7. See also 1 JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU,
PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 5-7 (1974).
3. In 1982, negotiations on Hong Kong's future began between China and
the United Kingdom. WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How
ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 206-07 (1993). Two years
later, the two countries signed a binding international agreement to establish
the framework for the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China on July
1, 1997, and create a temporary Special Administrative Region guaranteed
unchanged for fifty years, but over which China would maintain full control
of Hong Kong's defense and foreign affairs. See Joint Declaration of the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1366 (entered into force May 27,
1985) [hereinafter Sino-British Joint Declaration].
4. ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 23 (1992).
5. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xinzhengqu Jibenfa
(Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1511 (1990), available at
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application of the interpretation provision contained within,
and its effect on the ability of the HKSAR courts to maintain
their judicial independence as guaranteed by the Chinese and
British governments.! Part IV will explain the procedural his-
tory of the right of abode cases and how they challenge the
HKSAR courts' power of final adjudication and cause conflicts
between HKSAR and the PRC. Part V will analyze the differ-
ent judicial approaches of the two legal systems, and Part VI
will provide some alternatives that the HKSAR may implement
to avoid conflict with China's sovereignty interests.
II. HONG KONG'S RECENT HISTORY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH CHINA BEFORE 1997
The pursuit of sovereignty over Hong Kong has meant differ-
ent things to the Chinese government at various times, how-
ever, one significant meaning remained - "the demands of com-
merce."' Following the Communist takeover in 1949, Hong
Kong's economy developed rapidly with the influx of Chinese
refugee entrepreneurs and industrialists, who helped turn the
British colony into one of the major leading international busi-
ness centers in Asia. 9 Since then, Hong Kong experienced ex-
traordinary economic growth and shifted from poverty to pros-
perity.' By the 1980's, Hong Kong was the most prosperous
section of Asia after Japan," while the financial sectors in most
of the East and Southeast Asian areas were still underdevel-
http'/www.info.gov.hk/basiclaw/fulltext/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2002) [hereinafter Basic Law].
6. Id. art. 158.
7. Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 3, pmbl., 3(3).
8. See GHAI, supra note 2, at 36.
9. KEVIN P. LANE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATUS Quo: THE HISTORICAL
ROOTS OF CHINA'S HONG KONG POLICY 5 (1990). Geographically, Hong Kong is
located in the center of East Asia, with Korea and Japan to the North, Tai-
wan to the East, Singapore and Indonesia to the South and Vietnam and
Thailand to the West. See George L. Hicks, Hong Kong on the Eve of Com-
munist Rule, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG: TOWARD 1997 AND BEYOND 23, 48
(Hungdah Chiu et al. eds., 1987).
10. See, e.g., Asian Development Bank, Hong Kong, China, at
http'//www.adb.orgDocuments/Books/ADO/2001/hkg.asp (last visited Mar.
20, 2002). See generally LANE, supra note 9, at 1; Hicks, supra note 9, at 44.
11. Hicks, supra note 9, at 44.
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oped.'2 In order to promote commerce, foreign trade and in-
vestments, the British government implemented the policy of
laissez-faire'3 in Hong Kong and authorized the colony to be-
come a separate member of major international and economic
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
the World Customs Organization ("WCO"), the International
Monetary Fund and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
("APEC"), and to enter treaty relations with foreign states.1 4 As
a result, Hong Kong has become increasingly integrated into
the world economy'5 and plays a crucial role as home to the
most highly capitalized and specialized financial and trading
firms, which serve as intermediaries within and between Asia
and the global economy.'"
In the late 1970's, China began its long march toward eco-
nomic development and undertook fundamental shifts in its
economic policy. 7 Since then, China has experienced substan-
tial growth in its national output and an improvement in the
quality of life across the general population."' In addition to
the growth in both exports and imports between Hong Kong
and China, the possibility of overseas investment in China led
to increasing integration of the two economies.' 9 Rising labor
and land costs prompted many industrialists to relocate their
factories to the newly established Special Economic Zones ° on
12. Id. at 47.
13. See id. at 44; LANE, supra note 9, at 1.
14. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, Trade Policy and Trade Controls: Hong Kong's
Autonomy in Economic and Trade Matters After the Handover on 1 July 1997,
at http://www.info.gov.hk/tid/department/trade/hkauto.htm (last modified
Mar. 6, 2001).
15. LANE, supra note 9, at 3.
16. Id.
17. Y.C. Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prosperity After the Sino-British
Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG:
TOWARD 1997 AND BEYOND 57, 67 (Hungdah Chiu et al. eds., 1987).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 70; Hicks, supra note 9, at 51.
20. There are six Special Economic Zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou,
Xiamen, Hainan Province and Pudong New District. GHAI, supra note 2, at
117 n.16. These special zones are established to experiment with new eco-
nomic forms, providing a substantial role for foreign investment in the pri-
vate economy, but within the framework of a socialist modernization. Id. at
117. Within these Special Economic Zones, special laws may be enacted,
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the southern coast of China, just to the north of Hong Kong.21
Thus, Hong Kong's role as the main gateway to China, not only
for exports and imports but also investments, expanded drasti-
cally.' Nonetheless, major developments in relations between
Hong Kong and China did not advance significantly until the
Sino-British negotiations on the transfer of sovereignty started
in 1984.2
III. THE BASIC LAW
For six million Hong Kong people, the "social and economic
systems" and "life-style" are guaranteed to remain "unchanged
for 50 years."' The "one country, two systems"' principle, es-
tablished by the Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Ques-
tion of Hong Kong ("Sino-British Joint Declaration")26 in 1984,
sought to ensure that HKSAR would "enjoy a high degree of
autonomy."27 Moreover, HKSAR's legal system is assured of
establishing a different regime of laws, particularly commercial laws. Id. at
118. Their role is to facilitate direct investments or joint ventures by foreign
citizens, overseas Chinese nationals and compatriots in Hong Kong and
Macau. These investments and joint ventures are primarily for export pur-
poses, domestic sales that require special permission and to attract custom
duties. Id.
21. Jao, supra note 17, at 67.
22. Id. at 70. By the mid 1980's, Hong Kong has regularly provided about
one-third of China's hard-currency earnings, while China became Hong
Kong's second largest export market. Id. at 76-79. As early as 1969, China
was Hong Kong's largest country of origin, and by 1980, its largest country of
destination. Id.
23. Id. at 63-68.
24. Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 3, pmbl., I 3(5), 3(12).
25. This term was originally envisioned by Deng Xiaoping, the late Pre-
mier of the People's Republic of China. See generally Deng Xiaoping, One
Country, Two Systems (June 22-23, 1984), in ON THE QUESTION OF HONG
KONG 6-11 (The Bureau of the Compilation and Translation of Works of
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China trans., 1993).
26. Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 3, annex I, 23(c).
27. Id. pmbl., 3(2). However, HKSAR's "high degree of autonomy" does
not include "foreign and defense affairs which are the responsibilities of the
Central People's Government." Id. See also Basic Law, supra note 5, arts.
12-14.
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"independent judicial power" which includes "finality of judicial
decisions."28
Soon after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in
1984, a special committee, composed of members from both
Hong Kong and mainland China, was formed to draft the Basic
Law of the HKSAR" The six million local residents in HKSAR
consider the Basic Law the "mini-constitution." ° The official
tekt of the Basic Law, however, only refers to it as a "constitu-
tional document" 3 of the SAR and consists of the following sec-
tions:
(1) the body of the Basic Law which comprises a total of
nine chapters with 160 articles;
(2) Annex I, which sets out the method for the selection of
the Chief Executive of the HKSAR;
(3) Annex II, which sets out the method for the formation of
the Legislative Council of the HKSAR and its voting proce-
dures; and
(4) Annex III, which sets out the national laws to be applied
in the HKSAR.32
Article 158, Interpretation and Amendment of the Basic Law,
defines the power of interpretation as "vested in the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress" ("NPC"),33 and it
28. Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 3, pmbl., T 3(3). The Sino-
British Joint Declaration also provided that the "laws currently in force in
Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged." Id. See also Basic Law, supra
note 5, art. 8.
29. See generally Basic Law, supra note 5. The Basic Law was enacted by
the National People's Congress under article 31 of the PRC Constitution, and
came into effect on July 1, 1997. See XIANFA art. 31, (1982). The Basic Law
text exists in two official languages, Chinese and English, and there is no
easy textual way to reconcile the differences between the two languages.
30. Tom Clarke, Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration; Tsui Kuen Nang
v. Director Immigration; Director of Immigration v. Cheung Lai Wah: One
Basic Law, Two Interpretations, 23 MELB. U. L. REv. 773, 773 (1999).
31. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, The Document, at
http://www.info.gov.hk/basiclaw/fulltext/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2002).
32. Id.
33. Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 158. The NPC, China's form of a parlia-
ment, is the highest legislation-making body of the country. GHAI, supra note
2, at 99. The NPC approves or rejects suggestions issued by the State Coun-
cil (or the Central People's Government see infra note 36), including the elec-
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also states that the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress ("SCNPC) 34 shall "authorize the courts of the
HKSAR to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the
provisions of the Basic Law which are within the limits of the
autonomy of the HKSAR." 5 However, Article 158 further de-
fines that the HKSAR's Court of Final Appeal ("CFA") shall
"seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the
SCNPC" if the Court needs to interpret the provisions of the
Basic Law "concerning affairs that are the responsibility of the
Central People's Government ("CPG)."36 HKSAR courts must
follow the interpretation of the SCNPC However, judgments
previously rendered by the HKSAR courts "shall not be af-
fected."" Ironically, Article 158 does not specify who shall de-
termine what provisions must be referred to the NPC and
whether such provisions may be interpreted solely by the
courts of HKSAR."
tion of state president and vice president and other high-ranking politicians.
GHAI, supra note 2, at 99-103. The NPC also has the power to amend, enforce
and supervise the PRC Constitution. Id. This legislation body is responsible
for deciding on the ratification or abrogation of treaties and important
agreements with foreign states. Id. It is comprised of 3,000 deputies, repre-
senting the country's thirty provinces and various regions and municipalities.
Id.
34. The SCNPC is comprised of the chairman, vice chairmen and ap-
proximately 170 members. GHAI, supra note 2, at 103-05. The SCNPC is
responsible for implementing State Council decisions, which have been
adopted by the NPC, supervising the work of the State Council, the Central
Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, and fulfilling the role and responsibilities of the NPC when it
is not in session. Id.
35. Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 158 (emphasis added).
36. Id. The CPG, also known as the State Council, is the executive body of
the Chinese government - the Chinese government's cabinet. GHAI, supra
note 2, at 105-06. The CPG consists of the Premier, Vice-Premiers, Council-
ors, Ministers, the Auditor-General and the Secretary-General. Id. The CPG
formulate rules, makes policy decisions and coordinates the work of the vari-
ous state organs. Id. It is responsible for the day-to-day administration of"
the country. Id. Furthermore, it formulates the tasks and responsibilities of
the ministries and the commissions, supervises the local government admini-
stration bodies, and directs and administers the affairs of everything from
"education, culture, public health and family planning to civil affairs, judicial
matters and public security." Id.
37. Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 158.
38. Id.
39. GHAI, supra note 2, at 68.
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Initially, the SCNPC's role and power in interpreting the Ba-
sic Law under Article 158 prompted significant concern. °
Nonetheless, government officials in HKSAR and China as-
sured the public that the SCNPC's power of interpretation was
included in the Basic Law principally as a symbolic gesture to
Beijing and was not likely ever to be used.4' However, the right
of abode cases, which occurred subsequent to the Handover,"2
were filed by mainland China-born children of HKSAR perma-
nent resident parents.43 These cases questioned the power of
independent judicial review and final adjudication of the CFA,
the highest court of the land.44 These cases challenge the am-
biguity of Article 158's language and raise the interpretation
controversy between the courts of HKSAR and the NPC."5
IV. RIGHT OF ABODE CASES
A. Background
The HKSAR Court of Final Appeal's consolidated decisions in
Ng Ka Ling46 and Chan Kam Nga47 arose from separate judicial
40. Preserving the Rule of Law in Hong Kong After July 1, 1997: A Report
of a Mission of Inquiry: The Association of the Bar of the City of New York:
The Committee on Internatidnal Human Rights, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
367, 384 (1997).
41. Tenth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue Special Report: One
Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 12 n.37 (1999) [here-
inafter Reed Special Report].
42. The term, Handover, is referred to the event of the reversion of sover-
eignty on July 1, 1997.
43. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
44. PETER WESLEY-SMITH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG LEGAL
SYSTEM 70-71 (3d ed. 1998).
45. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
46. Ng Ka Ling (an infant) & Anor v. Director of Immigration; Tsui Kuen
Nang v. Director of Immigration; Director of Immigration v. Cheung Lai
Wah, (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, [1999] 1 HKLRD 315, [1999] 1 HKC 291 (Jan. 29,
1999), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfa/judmt/facv
14_16_98.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling].
47. Chan Kam Nga & Anor v. Director of Immigration, (1999) 2 HKCFAR
82, [1999] 1 HKLRD 304, [1999] 1 HKC 347 (Jan. 29, 1999), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/htmYcfa/judmt/facv-13_98.htm (last
visited Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Chan Kam Nga].
618 [Vol. XXVII:2
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review proceedings48 brought as test cases to assert the right of
abode in HKSAR by the mainland China born, natural children
of HKSAR permanent residents. 9 Each of these children re-
ported to the HKSAR Immigration Department, claiming their
right of abode, under Article 24 of the Basic Law, in the days
following the reversion of sovereignty on July 1, 1997.50 These
mainland China-born children either entered HKSAR illegally
after the Handover or overstayed a temporary entry permit
issued prior to the Handover.5'
Under Article 24(2) of the Basic Law,52 "Fundamental Rights
and Duties of the Residents," six categories of permanent resi-
dents are allowed in HKSAR:
(1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion;
(2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong
Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years be-
fore or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region;
(3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong
of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2);
(4) Persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered
Hong Kong with valid travel documents, have ordinarily re-
sided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than
seven years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of per-
manent residence before or after the establishment of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(5) Persons under 21 years of age born in Hong Kong of
those residents listed in category (4) before or after the estab-
lishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
and
(6) Persons other than those residents listed in categories
(1) to (5), who, before the establishment of the Hong Kong
48. See HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors., [1997] HKLRD 761, [1997]
2 HKC 315; Cheung Lai Wah v. Director of Immigration, [1997] HKLRD
101, [1997] 3 HKC 64; and Chan Kam Nga & Anor v. Director of Immigra-
tion, [1998] 1 HKLRD 142, [1998] 1 EIKC 16. These cases were combined and
heard as test cases on behalf of more than a thousand named immigrants
claiming the right of abode.
49. NgKa Ling, 1 HKLRD at 316.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 24(2).
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Special Administrative Region, had the right of abode in Hong
Kong only.
Furthermore, Article 24(3) provides that the above-
mentioned residents "shall have the right of abode in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region and shall be qualified to
obtain, in accordance with the laws of the Region, permanent
identity cards which state their right of abode."5 4
The right of abode cases as initiated by a challenge to the
constitutionality of certain HKSAR restrictive immigration leg-
islation, the Immigration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance ("No.
2 Ordinance")5 and the Immigration (Amendment) (No. 3) Or-
dinance ("No. 3 Ordinance"),56 passed and enacted by HKSAR's
Legislative Council ("LegCo")57 on July 1, 1997 and July 10,
1997 respectively.5 8 The appellants in these cases challenged
the two ordinances, which controlled the right of mainland
children of HKSAR permanent residents to immigrate to the
HKSAR, as unconstitutional and as violating their rights guar-
anteed by Article 24 of the Basic Law.59 The No. 2 Ordinance
provides that a child of a parent with the right of abode in
HKSAR is entitled to the right of abode only if the child's par-
ent already had the right when the child was born."0 The ordi-
nance also requires that those claiming the right of abode on
the basis of their fathers' right of abode must have been born
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 24(3) (emphasis added).
55. Hong Kong Immigration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance (July 1,
1997), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-98/english/bills/billslO/bills1O.htm
[hereinafter No. 2 Ordinance].
56. Hong Kong Immigration (Amendment) (No. 3) Ordinance (July 10,
1997), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-98/english/bills/bills 10/bills 1O.htm
[hereinafter No. 3 Ordinance].
57. The main functions of the LegCo of the HKSAR are to enact laws,
examine and approve budgets, taxation and public expenditure, and monitor
the work of the HKSAR government. GHAI, supra note 2, at 281-88. In addi-
tion, the LegCo is also given the power to endorse the appointment and re-
moval of the judges of the CFA and the Chief Judge of the High Court, as
well as the power to impeach the Chief Executive. Id. Also, the Basic Law
details the formation, term of office, powers and functions of the LegCo. See
Basic Law, supra note 5, arts. 66-79.
58. See No. 2 Ordinance, supra note 55; No. 3 Ordinance, supra note 56.
59. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 317-18. See also Basic Law, supra note 5,
art. 24.
60. No. 2 Ordinance, supra note 55, sched. 1, para. 2 (emphasis added).
620 [Vol. XXVII:2
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within a marriage.61 The No. 3 Ordinance establishes an ad-
ministrative immigration scheme, which requires mainland
residents claiming a right of abode through their parents to
apply for a "Certificate of Entitlement."62 In addition, each ap-
plicant must obtain a one-way exit permit to the HKSAR
through the mainland authorities, the Exit-Entry Administra-
tion of the Public Security Bureau ("PSB"), before being al-
lowed to emigrate.63
For many years, there has always been a significant demand
among Chinese nationals to settle in Hong Kong.64 Thus, Hong
Kong immigration law requires Chinese emigrants to apply for
an exit permit from the PSB, and a daily quota is agreed upon
previously by China and HKSAR administrations to limit the
issuance to 150 permits each day.65 The daily quota system is
implemented "in order to protect and maintain the economic
prosperity and social stability of Hong Kong," and to avoid a
mass and rapid influx of mainland emigrants.66 Hence, the
administrations need to take the necessary measures to control
the movement of nationals between Hong Kong and China.67
Although Hong Kong immigration law requires that all Chi-
nese mainlanders who obtained an exit permit by the PSB to
6L Id. sched. 1, para. 1(2) (emphasis added).
62. No. 3 Ordinance, supra note 56, sched. 1, para. 2(c).
63. Id. According to the Basic Law, HKSAR is authorized to maintain and
apply its own separate "immigration controls on entry into, stay in and de-
parture from [HKSAR] by persons from foreign states and regions." Basic
Law, supra note 5, art. 154.
64. GHAI, supra note 2, at 172 n.38. The standards of living and quality of
life in Hong Kong are significantly more superior than in China, some say on
average thirty times better off. See Hong Kong Diminished: Between Them,
the Government of Tung Chee-Hwa in Hong Kong and His Bosses in Beijing
Have Undermined the Territory's Rule of Law, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at
16, available at 1999 WL 7363714.
65. See GHAI, supra note 2, at 172; China Experts Attack Hong Kong Court
Decision on Children, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 6, 199, available at 1999
WL 2541544; No Kwai-Yan, Beijing Adviser Rejects Calls for His Resignation,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 5, 1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL 2520230.
66. GHM, supra note 2, at 172.
67. Id. In reference to the entry into Hong Kong of Chinese nationals
from other parts of China, the Sino-British Joint Declaration provided that it
"shall continue to be regulated in accordance with the present [quota] prac-
tice." Sinb-British Joint Declaration, supra note 3, annex I, pt. XIV.
2002] 621
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apply to a HKSAR immigration office, in practice, those who
had been given a permit were admitted automatically. 8
In the right of abode cases, all appellants had emigrated ille-
gally in contravention of the No. 3 Ordinance. 9  Some were
born outside of marriage, and therefore were denied the right
of abode provided for exclusively under the No. 2 Ordinance.0
In sum, abode appellants have the right to challenge three spe-
cific limitations of the Ordinances: (1) the requirement of a
mainland exit certificate; (2) the limitation of the right to chil-
dren born within marriage; and (3) the requirement that the
right of abode will have vested in at least one parent at the
time of the child's birth.7' Consequently, the issues in Ng Ka
Ling and Chan Kam Nga concentrated on whether the CFA
was required to refer the case to the SCNPC for interpretation
of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law under Article 158,
and whether the CFA would be capable of invalidating acts of
the NPC inconsistent with the Basic Law for enacting the No. 2
and No. 3 Ordinances.72
B. The Court of Final Appeal's Decisions
The right of abode cases presented the CFA with its first oc-
casion to exercise its power of judicial review under the Basic
Law.7' The CFA recognized that the ruling on the right of
abode cases would have far-reaching social, political and eco-
nomic consequences in HKSAR.74 In fact, the HKSAR admini-
stration would later maintain that a broad interpretation of the
right would open the doors to up to 1.67 million mainland im-
68. GHAI, supra note 2, at 173.
69. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 334-35.
70. Id. at 335.
71. Id. at 336; Chan Kam Nga, 1 HKLRD at 304-05.
72. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 317-18. See also Joseph W. Dellapenna,
Does the Rule of Law Matter in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion?, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION: COMMERCIAL AND
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 91, 109-10 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton
eds., 2000).
73. Cliff Buddle, Key Right-of-Abode Battle to Begin, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 28995761.
74. Chris Yeung, Pressure on Abode Court for Rethink, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Apr. 30, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 16766585.
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migrants over the next decade.75 However, the CFA resolved
the issues of right of abode in a manner that both accorded
with the language of the Basic Law and defended the inde-
pendence of HKSAR's judiciary.76 Since Article 158 does not
clearly state who determines which provisions of the Basic Law
must be referred to the SCNPC and which provisions may be
interpreted solely by the CFA, on January 29, 1999, the CFA
decided in Ng Ka Ling that it held this power exclusively:
In our view, it is for the Court of Final Appeal and for it alone
to decide [which interpretations must be referred] .... It is
significant that what has to be referred to the Standing
Committee is not the question of interpretation involved gen-
erally, but the interpretation of the specific excluded provi-
sions.77
Having declared its authority to decide the scope of any re-
ferral, the CFA concluded that the interpretation of Article 24,
guaranteeing the right of abode, was a matter for its own de-
termination rather than interpretation by the SCNPC.7' Thus,
the CFA invalidated two of the three limitations imposed by
the No. 2 and No. 3 Ordinances.7 ' The CFA held that the No. 2
Ordinance's restriction of the right of abode to children born
within marriage violated the Basic Law. 0 First, the CFA ruled
that the No. 2 Ordinance discriminated between legitimate and
illegitimate children and was antithetical to the "principle of
equality" 1 enshrined in both the Basic Law and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 2 The
75. Chris Yeung & Angela Li, Lawyers Make Urgent Plea on Abode Deci-
sion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 18, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL
16768517; Frank Ching, Hong Kong: Judgment Call: China's Denunciation of
a Hong Kong Court Ruling Not Only Threatens the Territory's Judicial Inde-
pendence But Raises Questions About 'One Country, Two Systems,' FAR E.
ECON. REV., Feb. 18, 1999, at 20, available at 1999 WL-FEER 8674470.
76. Yash Ghai, Litigating the Basic Law: Jurisdiction, Interpretation and
Procedure, in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER
INTERPRETATION 3, 17-19 (Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000).
77. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 342-43.
78. Id. at345.
79. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 71.
80. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 352-54.
81. Id. at 352.
82. See Basic Law, supra note 5, arts. 25, 39; The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The ICCPR
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CFA also found that the "plain meaning" of Article 24 sug-
gested that "[a] child born out of wedlock is no more or less a
person born of [a permanent] resident than a child born in wed-
lock."83 Second, the CFA found the No. 2 Ordinance's restric-
tion of the right to children born after their parents already
had acquired permanent residency status unconstitutional.m
The Court held that the "natural meaning" of Article 24 in-
cluded all children born of permanent residents, regardless of
when the parents acquired such status." The Court further
stated that an unrestricted right of abode "enabl[es] the child
to be with the parent [in HKSAR], thereby, securing the unity
of the family.""6 However, the CFA ruled that the Director of
Immigration of HKSAR could require verification of an indi-
vidual's claim to permanent resident status.8 ' Thus, the Court
held that the No. 3 Ordinance's requirement of a Certificate of
Entitlement from the HKSAR was permissible, so long as the
Immigration Department operated the scheme in "a fair and
reasonable manner" without "unlawful delay."8
C. The Aftermath
The CFA's reasoning in Ng Ka Ling emphasized consistency
with the Basic Law, HKSAR's political autonomy and the im-
portance of individual rights rather than the sovereign author-
ity of the NPC" The CFA declared that "the courts must avoid
a literal, technical, narrow or rigid approach,"" and relied on
what it viewed as standard "common law" methods."1  How-
originally became applicable to Hong Kong through ratification and/or exten-
sion by the United Kingdom and continues to apply despite the change of
sovereignty. See GHAI, supra note 2, at 406-09. The Basic Law provides that
the ICCPR and other international conventions as applied to Hong Kong
shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the
HKSAR. See Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 39(1).
83. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 353.
84. Id. at 352-54; Chan Kam Nga, 1 HKLRD at 306, 313-14.
85. Chan Kam Nga, 1 HKLRD at 310.
86. Id. (construing ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 23(1)).
87. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 348.
88. Id.
89. See Clarke, supra note 30, at 780. See also Reed Special Report, supra
note 41, at 18.
90. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKLRD at 340.
91. Id.
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ever, the CFA's ruling in Ng Ka Ling immediately received
many critical responses.92 Some perceived aspects of the deci-
sion as threatening to China's sovereignty and as usurping the
SCNPC's ultimate interpretive authority over the Basic Law."
Others feared that the HKSAR administration's concern over
increased immigration might lead it to disregard the CFA rul-
ing.94 Dr. Raymond Wu Wai-Yung, a local Basic Law Commit-
tee member and leading advisor to the CPG on how to interpret
the Basic Law, argued that the "CFA's decision was simply
wrong."95 Dr. Wu maintained that the CFA should have re-
ferred the right of abode issues to the SCNPC for its interpre-
tation, and the Basic Law should have been interpreted in ac-
cordance with the mainland legal system, not the common law
principles that the CFA adopted. 6 Although Dr. Wu reiterated
that the CFA was independent from the local executive and
legislature, he insisted that HKSAR is part of China and its
judicial independence could not override China's sovereign
rights. Furthermore, four influential mainland legal ex-
92. Professor Jerome A. Cohen, a prominent Chinese law expert at New
York University Law School, pointed out CFA's failure to ask the SCNPC
whether mainland migrants needed permission from Chinese authorities to
leave the mainland, and further criticized the CFA, stating: "The court, I
think, set in motion the whole political [right of abode] crisis." See Cliff Bud-
dle, Court Flunked Test, Says U.S. Professor, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 6.
1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL 30351120. Law Professor Xiao Weiyun of
Beijing University argued that the Ng Ka Ling decision was in direct opposi-
tion to the interest of Hong Kong residents and has hindered efforts to main-
tain stability and prosperity. See Rone Tempest, Hong Kong-Beijing Dispute
Deepens China: Mainland Official Assails Ruling by Territory's Top Court,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A4, available at 1999 WL 2128294. See generally
XIAO WEIY=N ET AL., WHY THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL WAS WRONG:
COMMENTS OF THE MAINLAND SCHOLARS ON THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
FINAL APPEAL, reprinted in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT
OVER INTERPRETATION 53 (Johannes M.M. Chan trans., Johannes M.M. Chan
et al. eds., 2000).
93. Landmark Ruling, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 14,
available at 1999 WL 2519692.
94. Test for Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at 14, available
at 1999 WL 2520660.
95. Reed Special Report, supra note 41, at 21. See No, supra note 65, at 4;
Angela Li, Step Down Call to Beijing Adviser, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
4, 1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL 2520100.
96. See Reed Special Report, supra note 41, at 21; No, supra note 65, at 5.
97. See No, supra note 65, at 5.
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perts," who had helped draft the Basic Law, challenged the Ng
Ka Ling decision, claiming the CFA had abrogated to itself
powers that must remain invested with the NPC"
On February 12, 1999, the Chief Executive of the HKSAR,
Tung Chee-Hwa, dispatched HKSAR's Secretary for Justice,
Elsie Leung, to Beijing to discuss the right of abode ruling with
the Chinese government authorities.' 0 Moreover, on February
24, 1999, the HKSAR administration filed an "application for
clarification" of the right of abode judgment with the CFA.'0 ' In
response to the clarification request, the CFA issued a brief
opinion ("Ng Ka Ling (No. 2)") clarifying its decision in Ng Ka
Ling.'°2 In its brief opinion, the CFA held that its judicial power
is "derived from and is subject to" the Basic Law, and acknowl-
edged that the Court was following "an exceptional course" by
reconsidering or "clarifying" its prior judgment."3 However, the
CFA did not expressly vacate or modify any of the conclusions
from its original decision.' Instead, the Ng Ka Ling (No. 2)
opinion acknowledged the initial grant of interpretive authority
to the SCNPC as stated in Article 158 of the Basic Law.' 5
Meanwhile, the HKSAR administration repeatedly stressed
the severe social problems and unbearable consequences that
would be triggered by the Ng Ka Ling decision, including the
fact that social resources could hardly meet the immediate
needs of this large group of immigrants for "education, housing,
98. Professors Xiao Weiyun and Shao Tianren of Beijing University, Pro-
fessor Wu Jianfan of the Legal Research Centre of the Social Science Acad-
emy of the PRC and Professor Xu Chongde of the People's University in Bei-
jing. See XIAO, supra note 92, at 53-59.
99. See Rowan Callick, China Lays Down Some Basic Law in Hong Kong,
AUSTL. FIN. REv., Feb. 10, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 5066225.
100. See Chris Yeung & Cheung Yi, Law Chief in Beijing Abode Trip, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2520786.
101. Johannes M.M. Chan, What the Court of Final Appeal Has Not Clari-
fied in Its Clarification: Jurisdiction and Amicus Intervention, in HONG
KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION 171, 172
(Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000).
102. Ng Ka Ling & Others v. Director of Immigration (No. 2), (1999) 2
HKCFAR 141, [1999] 1 HKLRD 577, [19991 1 HKC 425 (Feb. 26, 1999),
available at http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfa/judmt/facv 14
16 98a. htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling (No. 2)].
103. Ng Ka Ling (No. 2), 1 HKLRD at 577.
104. Id.
105. Id. See also Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 158.
626 [Vol. XXVI:2
RIGHT OF ABODE CONTROVERSY
medical and health services, social welfare and other needs."'°6
Since the Handover, Hong Kong's government had already put
43,000 mainland children into an education system whose pri-
mary schools have long run on half-day shifts because of over-
crowding.1 7 Hence, a special government task force was set up
to oversee the influx of mainland children created by the Ng Ka
Ling ruling.0 8 The task force also sought to establish a means
of regulating the potential massive influx, by arranging a DNA
testing system to detect and eliminate frauds.'0 9 However,
many mainlanders contested the requirement of DNA typing of
parents and child, a procedure that could cost between $300
and $1,000, and which would impose a prohibitive sum for the
mainland families,"0  whose average annual income was
roughly $840."'
106. C.H. Tung, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion, Report on Seeking Assistance from the Central People's Government in
Solving the Problems Encountered in the Implementation of the Basic Law of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China, in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER
INTERPRETATION 474, 476 (Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/basiclaw/english/f04.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002)
[hereinafter Chief Executive's Report]. See also Chee-Hwa Tung, Opening
Remarks at the Press Conference on Right of Abode Issue (May 18, 1999), at
http://www.info.gov.hklce/speech/cesp.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) [here-
inafter Chief Executive's Remarks].
107. See Hong Kong: Enter the Children, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1999, at 42,
available at 1999 WL 7361636.
108. See id. See also CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT OF HKSAR,
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF MAINLANDERS WITH RIGHT OF ABODE (1999),
reprinted in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER
INTERPRETATION 265-87 (Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
CENSUS REPORT]. See, e.g., Billy Wong Wai-Yuk & Jimmy Cheung, Taskforce
on Migrants Calculations Begin Amid Fears of Huge Influx After Abode Rul-
ing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL
2519942.
109. See Diane Stormont, International: Hong Kong Freedoms Challenged
By Beijing, DAILY TEL. (LONDON), Feb. 10, 1999, at 13, available at 1999 WL
12599576.
110. See Anne Stewart, DNA Tests a Costly Solution, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL 2519986; Billy Wong Wai-Yuk,
Hopeful Migrants Face Steep DNA Bills, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 4,
1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL 2520095.
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According to HKSAR's estimations, in addition to some
13,000 children who have the Certificate of Entitlement and
are now guaranteed their right of abode, another 75,000 could
arrive in the next four years, and up to 400,000 are waiting to
arrive in the next decade."2 Moreover, HKSAR estimated the
influx of children would cost $91 billion"3 in additional capital
spending to provide "housing, education, vocational training
and retraining, medical and health care, welfare services, em-
ployment services, and transport.". 4 Consequently, the Ng Ka
Ling ruling outraged many ordinary Hong Kong citizens, who
feared the massive influx and the strain it would put on social
services in a time of deep recession." 5 However, the HKSAR
government's calculations did not include the benefits that
would flow from the expenditures, particularly employment
opportunities and the benefits of an increased number of young
migrants in a rapidly aging population." 6
Although the HKSAR government had the option to amend
the Basic Law by legislative voting, HKSAR's Chief Executive
Tung Chee-Hwa eventually turned to China to settle the right
of abode dispute."7 The HKSAR government dismissed the
amendment option, claiming that it could not take place for
another ten months, when the NPC would next meet, a delay
too long to contemplate."8 Furthermore, the HKSAR govern-
ment stated that "there [was] no guarantee even then, that the
NPC would make any amendments."" 9 Therefore, on May 20,
1999, Chief Executive Tung submitted a formal report to the
112. Hong Kong: Enter the Children, supra note 107, at 42.
113. The estimated expenditure of HKD $710 billion (Hong Kong dollars) is
approximately USD $91 billion. Mark Landler, Beijing Overturns a Hong
Kong Court Ruling on the Residency Status of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 1999, at A9, available at 1999 WL 30525282. See also CENSUS REPORT,
supra note 108, at 275.
114. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 108, at 275.
115. Hong Kong: Whose Laws?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 1999, at 38, available
at 1999 WL 7361997. At that time, Hong Kong was mired in 7% economic
recession. See Rowan Callick, Beijing Pressing To Have Last Word, AUSTL.
FIN. REV., Feb. 10, 1999, at 11, available at 1999 WL 5066247.
116. Hong Kong Diminished, supra note 64, at 16.
117. Craig S. Smith & Christina Mungan, Hong Kong Vows to Challenge
China Intervention, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1999, at A19, available at 1999
WL-WSJ 5458196.
118. See Chief Executive's Remarks, supra note 106.
119. Id.
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State Council in Beijing, requesting that the State Council ask
the SCN-PC to interpret the relevant provisions of the Basic
Law according to the "true legislative intent."12 ° As a result,
the HKSAR government, particularly its Chief Executive, re-
ceived heavy criticism from local legal communities for taking
the case up to Beijing, jeopardizing the rule of law and com-
promising the independence of the judiciary.'2 ' Nonetheless,
substantial numbers of people in Hong Kong expressed support
for the government's decision to ask for SCNPC's interpreta-
tion, and hoped that the SCNPC would revoke the right of
abode from the new migrants or reduce the excessive numbers
of eligible mainland children under the Ng Ka Ling ruling.
22
D. The Standing Committee Interpretation of the Basic Law
On June 26, 1999, the Standing Committee of the Ninth Na-
tional People's Congress at its Tenth Session issued an "inter-
pretation" of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law.'
The SCNPC stated in its interpretation that the CFA failed to
seek an interpretation of the SCNPC in compliance with the
requirement of Article 158(3) of the Basic Law.24 The SCNPC
justified its interpretation by declaring that those relevant pro-
visions, Articles 22 and 24, "concern affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People's Government and concern
the relationship between the Central Authorities" 12 and the
HKSAR. Hence, the SCNPC's interpretation overturned the
CFA's stance on Article 24, and stated "the interpretation of
120. See Chief Executive's Report, supra note 106, at 477.
121. F.T. McCarthy, Hong Kong: Whose Law?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 29811990. See also Hong Kong Diminished, supra note
64, at 16; Bretigne Shaffer, Hong Kong Undermines Its Own Freedom, WALL
ST. J., July 2, 1999, at A12, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5458970.
122. See Smith & Mungan, supra note 117; Landler, supra note 113, at 9.
123. The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
adopted on June 26, 1990, by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its Tenth Session, 38
I.L.M. 1469 (1999), available at http'//www.info.gov.hk/basicjlaw/fulltext/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Interpretation].
124. Id. at 1469.
125. Id.
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the Court of Final Appeal is not consistent with the legislative
intent.'
26
The SCNPC's interpretation made no attempt to explain why
the CFA's interpretation was incorrect or why such a require-
ment should apply to those who seek the right of abode.1 ' 7 It
simply stated that the relevant provisions "mean ... such par-
ents must have fulfilled the condition prescribed by category (1)
or (2) of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law ... at the time of [the
child's] birth.'' 128 The SCNPC found that the Basic Law gives
residency rights only to children whose parents were Hong
Kong residents when they were born, but agreed that the right
extends to children born out of wedlock.' 29  Although the
SCNPC overturned the CFA's decision, the right of abode in
HKSAR, which has been acquired under the judgment of the
CFA on the Ng Ka Ling ruling "shall not be affected."3 ° Here,
the SCNPC did not apply its interpretation retrospectively.1
3
'
While the SCNPC's interpretation defused the immigration
crisis, as repeatedly emphasized by the HKSAR administra-
tion, a "subtle but real constitutional conflict remains."'32 In
the CFA's clarification opinion, the Court held that "it cannot
question the authority of the National People's Congress or the
Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with
the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein. 33
However, problems may arise if the CFA believes that the
NPC's acts are inconsistent with the Basic Law.' Inevitably,
HKSAR's judicial independence will suffer and the CFA's inde-
pendent constitutional review power will be detrimentally frus-
trated, since the NPC can easily interfere and re-interpret the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1469-70.
128. Id. at 1470.
129. Interpretation, supra note 123, at 1470.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Frank Shihong Hong, International Decision: Ng Ka Ling v. Director of
Immigration. 2 HKCFAR 4. Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, January 29, 1999, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 167, 171 (2000).
133. Ng Ka Ling (No. 2), 1 HKLRD, at 577.
134. Regardless of how CFA handles the issue, the integrity of all involved
will be damaged. The CFA's power will be undermined, China will be ac-
cused of interfering in Hong Kong's affairs and the HKSAR government will
be criticized for not defending judicial independence.
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Basic Law without giving any explanation, and simply state
that it is the responsibility of the Central People's Govern-
ment.
135
V. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE HKSAR LEGAL
SYSTEMS
The SCNPC's interpretation underscored the differences be-
tween mainland legal interpretation and the approach of the
common law, which was to be maintained in HKSAR under
Article 8 of the Basic Law. 13' As a mainland institution, the
SCNPC invariably approached the Basic Law from the PRC
interpretive tradition.137 Hence, China's legal experts were
astonished by the CFA's ruling in Ng Ka Ling.' From China's
point of view, the right of abode crisis was a great annoyance
because of the fact that HKSAR seemed to have allowed itself
to be over-run by massive mainland influx.39 A Chinese legal
expert, Professor Xu Chongde,"4 ' publicly criticized the CFA's
judgment and asked, "how could the Court of Final Appeal, as
Hong Kong's highest court, have made a decision that was so
bad for the territory?"' The Professor further denounced the
CFA ruling and stated that the resulting negative impact has
been in "direct opposition to the interests of Hong Kong resi-
dents and has hindered efforts to maintain stability and pros-
perity" in Hong Kong."
This question underpins the essence of the dispute between
the two sides, and is the fundamental difference between the
common law system in HKSAR and China's socialist legal sys-
tem. At its most fundamental, it is the rule of law versus the
135. Yash Ghai, The NPC Interpretation and Its Consequences, in HONG
KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION 199, 207-09
(Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000).
136. Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 8.
137. Hongshi Wen, Interpretation of Law by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE:
CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION 183, 188-95 (Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds.,
2000). See also XIANFA art. 67, sec. 4 (1982).
138. Wen, supra note 137, at 206-07.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
141. China: NPC Clarifies Basic Law, CHINA DAILY, July 7, 1999, at 4,
available at 1999 WL 17780753.
142. Id.
20021 631
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
rule by law."' The Chinese phrase that expresses the notion of
"the rule of law" (fa zhi) could also be translated as "rule by
law.""4 Similarly, the PRC Constitution, Xianfa,'45 is not law in
the English common law sense."6 Under the rule of law inher-
ited by Hong Kong, decisions in courts are made strictly accord-
ing to the law.4 7 The common law court generally defers the
social consequences of its decision to the administration, focus-
ing mainly on the interpretation of the law. '  On the other
hand, the Chinese legal system takes into consideration such
issues as the consequences of every decision and action.'
Under the Chinese legal system, the NPC is the highest state
organ and enjoys both the power to enact and interpret legisla-
tion.'5 ° The NPC's legislative acts and decisions are "not sub-
ject to challenge or veto by any other [state] organ."'' There-
fore, if the SCNPC adopts a decision that is inconsistent with
the national law, no court in China has jurisdiction to declare
the decision invalid.'52 Indeed, the only redress is to invite the
NPC or the SCNPC to reconsider its decision."'
In China, the role of the court is confined to adjudicating
cases.5 The concept of constitutional review by judicial organ
simply does not exist in the mainland system. 5 Its legal sys-
tem is based on the socialist theory that all powers arise from
the people and should ultimately rest in the people, whose will
is reflected by the NPC, the "supreme soviet."'56 The courts on
the mainland would never make a judgment that affects the
stability of society, even if it means sacrificing the integrity and
143. Dellapenna, supra note 72, at 126-28.
144. Id. at 126.
145. See generally XIANFA; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
146. See Ann D. Jordan, Lost in the Translation, Two Legal Cultures, the
Common Law Judiciary and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 335, 337-38 (1997).
147. See id. at 348-50.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
151. XIAO, supra note 92, at 54.
152. See CHEN, supra note 4, at 105. See also XIANFA arts. 3, 92, 110, 128 &
133 (1982).
153. See CHEN, supra note 4, at 105.
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consistency of its law."7 Instead of recognizing the doctrine of
separation of powers,5 ' the PRC system is based on separation
of functions and responsibilities,'59 under the unified guidance
of the organs of state power.6
On the other hand, Hong Kong is under a very different sys-
tem, the common law. Article 8 of the Basic Law provides that
the "laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and
customary law shall be maintained" and preserved in the
HKSAR. '6 The common law believes in the separation of pow-
ers, and the power of interpretation of law rests solely in the
judiciary." Neither the legislature nor the executive has the
power to make authoritative interpretations of the law.' 63 In
fact, the sole power of the judiciary to pronounce authoritative
interpretation of legislation goes to the very root of the common
law system."
Nonetheless, Law Professor Shao Tianren 5 of Beijing Uni-
versity asserted that Hong Kong courts did not enjoy the power
of constitutional review before the Handover because of the
doctrine of supremacy of Parliament under English law.
66
Therefore, even under the guarantee of Article 8 of the Basic
Law, HKSAR courts could not have this power after the Hand-
over. 7 However, under the common law system, no organ is
157. Ching, supra note 75, at 20.
158. The doctrine of separation of powers is established by the landmark
United States Supreme Court decision, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
159. The separation of functions and responsibilities is among the "admin-
istrative, adjudicative and procuratorial organs." CHEN, supra note 4, at 108.
160. Id.
161. Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 8 (emphasis added).
162. See generally Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
163. Id.
164. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CoNsTITTIoNAL LAw 328 (6th
ed., 2000).
165. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
166. See XIAO, supra note 92, at 56. Professor Shao argued that Hong
Kong, as a British colony, was not empowered to challenge an Act of Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom. See id. Likewise, HKSAR does not have the
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above the law.'68 Even before the Handover, the doctrine of the
supremacy of Parliament had not prevented the Hong Kong
courts from declaring certain legislation invalid if the Parlia-
ment failed to comply with the manner and form requirements
for legislative amendments. '69
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the sovereignty interest of the PRC inevitably con-
flicted with the CFA's ruling in Ng Ka Ling.'0 Hong Kong saw
the Basic Law as a legal guarantee of autonomy, right and a
capitalist economy."' The populous envisioned an independent
judicial system with the powers to enforce the Basic Law,
which was a primary means of underwriting that guarantee.
7 2
To the contrary, the Chinese government viewed judicial re-
view as a restriction on its powers as sovereign, as well as com-
plicating its overview of the HKSAR.17'3 Beijing preferred a le-
gal system whereby the mode of interpretation was more politi-
cal and flexible.7 4 Moreover, the SCNPC interpretation repre-
sented a significant step toward a hybrid legal system in
HKSAR, away from the idea of "one country, two systems.'7 5
There are alternative methods available to resolve similar
judicial review controversies in the future. From China's per-
spective, Xianfa and the NPC are supreme in the mainland,17 6
and their supremacy is materialized in HKSAR through the
168. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 164, at 85.
169. See generally JOSEPH JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
LEGAL PROBLEMS 155-78 (1980). Since the promulgation of the Hong Kong
(Legislative Power) Orders in 1986 and 1989, the Hong Kong courts might
declare an English Act repealed if it was inconsistent with a local statute in
certain defined areas. See GHAI, supra note 2, at 213-14.
170. XIAO, supra note 92, at 53-56.
171. See GHAI, supra note 2, at 139-42.
172. Id.
173. See XIAO, supra note 92, at 53-59. See also supra notes 95-99, 139-42
and accompanying text.
174. Hong Kong: Uncharted Territory, Bus. ASIA, Feb. 22, 1999, available
at 1999 WL 10768451.
175. Hong Kong Diminished, supra note 64, at 16; No Kwai-Yan, Concern
for Judicial System After Mainland Experts Say Migrants Verdict Challenges
NPC, Crisis Fear Over Attack on Court, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 8, 1999,
at 1, available at 1999 WL 2520459.
176. See XIAO, supra note 92, at 53-56.
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framework of the Basic Law.17 7 Thus, the Basic Law is the
bridge between the two conflicting legal systems and legal cul-
tures. However, the success of this linkage largely depends on
the relationship between China and HKSAR and the develop-
ment of constitutionalism in China. The Basic Law recognizes
and preserves the internal differences of the two legal sys-
tems,78 but it lacks an institutional structure to generate posi-
tive consensus between both sides, and particularly, to restrain
Chinese authorities from possible interference. Hence, sugges-
tions to resolve future controversies include: (1) strengthening
the communication channel between the two conflicting legal
systems; (2) establishing a formal dispute resolution mecha-
nism in the Basic Law; and (3) amending relevant provisions in
the Basic Law to clearly identify under what circumstances the
CFA should seek an interpretation from the N-PC.
If China pledges to maintain the "one country, two systems"
principle, the PRC government must demonstrate a commit-
ment to preserve the rule of law in HKSAR, its judicial inde-
pendence, finality of judicial decisions, as well as other judicial
qualities that have been known in practice in Hong Kong for
the past decades. Undoubtedly, the common law system has
been a central component of what makes Hong Kong among the
most stable, open and productive societies both in Asia and the
world. 179  The right of abode controversy reflects a perilous
threat to the common law system, and merits the attention and
concern of lawyers around the world' 80 In contrast to the
original right of abode cases, subsequent CFA rulings have
avoided challenging Beijing's authority and held that the
SCNPC's interpretation was a "valid and binding interpreta-
tion" of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law, which the
177. See generally Basic Law, supra note 5, art. 158.
178. See generally Basic Law, supra note 5.
179. Yuan-li Wu, In the Shadow of 1997: Interaction Between Hong Kong
and Its Economic Partners and Neighbors, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG:
TOWARD 1997 AND BEYOND 139, 140-41 (Hungdah Chiu et al. eds., 1987).
180. See Lucia Tangi, Powers Told to Back Off Controversy, H.K. STANDARD,
Feb. 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5640657; Jill McGivering, Britain in
Clash over Hong Kong Law, THE TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at 9, available at 1999
WL 7972003.
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courts of the HKSAR are under a duty to follow.'8' In its recent
ruling, Ng Siu Tung, 2 the CFA followed the SCNPC's interpre-
tation and ruled that the right of abode applied only to mi-
grants who arrived before the Handover on July 1, 1997, with
parents who were permanent HKSAR residents at the time.83
Those who arrived after the Handover, but before January 29,
1999 (the decision date of Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga),
may be allowed to stay under the case by case discretion of the
Director of Immigration, if they can show the HKSAR govern-
ment's promise or representation gives rise to a "legitimate ex-
pectation.""4 Whether this judgment marks the end of the
right of abode controversy will depend on the HKSAR govern-
ment's attitude on reconsidering the removal orders to those
remaining appellants,'8 ' and how serious those mainland Chi-
nese abode-seekers, who failed in the recent legal battle, are in
planning to appeal to the United Nations.' Should the right of
abode controversy turn out to have been an isolated event, as
181. Lau Kong Yung & Others v. Director of Immigration, (1999) 2
HKCFAR 300, [1999] 2 HKLRD 58 (Dec. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfa/judmtfacv10_11-99.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2002) (The CFA upheld the HKSAR government's right to
deport 17 mainland children, who were born before their parents had ob-
tained the right to live in Hong Kong.).
182. Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Director of Immigration, FACV Nos. 1-3 of
2001 (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/doc/prd/html
/whatsnew/engjud/FACVOOOOO_2001.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002)
[hereinafter Ng Siu Tung].
183. See id.
184. Id. Over 1,000 of those 5,114 appellants have previously received
specific statement from the Director of Immigration in standard letters, stat-
ing that the HKSAR government would treat persons who fell within the
category whose status was being determined by the court as if they were
parties to the litigation. Id. Hence, in Ng Siu Tung, the CFA applied the
"doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation" and allowed those appellants'
cases to be reconsidered by the Director of Immigration if they can show a
"legitimate expectation that they would receive the same treatment as the
parties in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga, and that the judgments in those
cases would be implemented by the Director of Immigration in their cases."
Id.
185. Matt Pottinger, Hong Kong Ruling Rejects Abode Seekers, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 11, 2002, at A8, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3382699. See also China:
Ruling on Hong Kong Residency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at A6.
186. Alan Low, Abode-Seekers to Take Hong Kong Case to United Nations,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2314074.
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the HKSAR administration maintains, the damage done need
be neither fundamental nor lasting. If, however, further re-
quests lead to additional reinterpretation from the NPC, then
Hong Kong's common law traditions will necessarily erode.
Thus, it is strongly recommended that the PRC and HKSAR
governments consider the available alternative resolutions.
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